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INVERTED THEORIES
Lee Anne Fennell* and Richard H. McAdams†
Simple theoretical models play a large role in the legal academy. They
typically embed strong assumptions, which double as qualifications. When
the assumptions are thought to be roughly accurate, or inaccurate in trivial
or irrelevant ways, the theory’s primary claim takes center stage and the
qualifications may be downplayed or even ignored. But what if a critical
assumption is widely known to be patently false or extremely implausible?1
Here, we see several responses. A surprisingly popular one is to ignore the
assumption’s falsity altogether and embrace the theory anyway. Another
robust approach is to reject the theory as being built on a foundation of
sand, and refuse to have anything more to do with it. We would like to draw
attention in this essay to a third alternative: using a theory’s radically
unrealistic assumptions to “invert” it. This approach allows scholars to
draw lessons from the theory—indeed, sometimes the very ones that the
theorist originally had in mind—by turning the spotlight on the implications
of the untrue assumptions.
A well-known example of inversion involves the Coase Theorem, which
in its popular formulation holds that if transaction costs are zero, an
efficient result will always be reached regardless of the initial allocation of
entitlements.2 The zero transaction cost assumption is, of course, wildly
unrealistic—a fact Coase emphasized from the outset.3 A different and
better way to articulate the Coase Theorem is to invert it: Because
transaction costs are positive, the initial allocation of entitlements can
matter to efficiency.4 This rearticulation puts the emphasis where Coase
*
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am grateful for research support from the Harold J. Green Faculty Fund and the SNR Denton Fund.
†
Bernard D. Meltzer Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. For conversations about this
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1
See DANI RODRIK, ECONOMICS RULES: THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF THE DISMAL SCIENCE 27 (2015)
(explaining that “an assumption is critical if its modification in an arguably more realistic direction would produce
a substantive difference in the conclusion presented by the model”).
2
R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960). George Stigler named the Theorem, not
Coase himself. G.J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 113 (3d ed. 1966).
3
Coase, supra note 2, at 15 (“The argument has proceeded up to this point on the assumption . . . that there
were no costs involved in carrying out market transactions. This is, of course, a very unrealistic assumption.”).
4
For example, Mitch Polinsky defines “the more complicated version of the Coase Theorem” as follows: “If
there are positive transaction costs, the efficient outcome may not occur under every legal rule.” A. Mitchell
Polinsky, The Coase Theorem, in AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 15 (4th ed. 2011). See also
Deirdre McCloskey, The So-Called Coase Theorem, 24 EASTERN ECON J. 367, 367 (1998) (“Economists have
gotten the ‘theorem’ wrong; in fact backwards.”); Stephen G. Medema, The Myth of Two Coases: What Coase Is
Really Saying, 28 J. ECON. ISSUES 208, 213 (1994) (stressing Coase’s focus on transaction costs and institutional
arrangements and observing that “[t]he ‘popular Coase’ is a fiction.” Because the need to “invert” (as we term it)
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himself did. Although the popular or “uninverted” form of the Coase
Theorem still receives a lot of play, law and economics scholars seem well
attuned to the significance of the zero transaction cost qualification.5 Of
course, it is in their interest to heed the qualification: if law can never matter
to efficiency, their life’s work is pointless.
In this essay, we consider four other theoretical models that are good
candidates for inversion: Nozick’s entitlement theory of distributive justice,
the Tiebout Hypothesis, Kaplow and Shavell’s principle of tax superiority,
and the Prisoners’ Dilemma. In the first three cases, the original theorists
recognized the dependence of their theories’ main takeaways on strong
assumptions that did not align with reality. In the case of the Prisoners’
Dilemma, the specific conditions that produced the dominant equilibrium
and associated normative punchline were baked into the game’s structure.
Later users of these ideas as inputs into policy prescriptions have, however,
tended to downplay the significance of the qualifications. In all of these
cases, we submit, the better basis for policy is the inverted version of the
theory that puts the qualifications at center stage.
Theories well-suited for inversion should not be taken at face value, we
argue, but they should not be discarded either. Rather, they can usefully
focus attention on the conditions that render their supporting assumptions
false, and thereby push scholarly attention in productive directions. The
logical parameters of the original theory offer a structure for the inverted
analysis, which differs from a general critique or rejection of the theory.
The discussion below proceeds in three steps. Part I outlines the
conditions that make a theoretical construct ripe for inversion, using the
Coase Theorem to illustrate. Part II focuses on our four additional
examples—theories that we maintain are more useful and powerful when
inverted. Part III distinguishes inversion from critiques and warnings, and
explores some of the concerns that might surround the inversion exercise.
I. CONDITIONS FOR INVERSION
There are three basic ingredients that make a theoretical model
particularly suitable for inversion. First, it must contain strong and
unrealistic critical assumptions. Second, it must have generated a widelythe popular articulation of the Coase Theorem is well-known, we use the example to introduce the concept, but
focus below on theories where the needed inversion is less understood.
5
But perhaps this development is relatively recent, at least in some quarters. See McCloskey, supra note 4,
at 368 (“Something like a dozen people in the world understand that the ‘Coase’ theorem is not the Coase
theorem. One of this select group is Ronald Coase himself...”); Robert C. Ellickson, The Case for Coase and
Against “Coaseanism,” 99 YALE L.J. 611 (1989) (observing that in an article by John Donohue, “which in this
regard is representative of law-and-economics writing in general, Coase's name is consistently attached to
propositions that he has explicitly repudiated”) (footnote omitted); Medema, supra note 4, at 210 (observing that
there are “a legion of people who have misinterpreted (or failed to read) Coase’s message”).
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shared popular understanding with a simple normative prescription that
hinges (wittingly or not) on the truth of the unrealistic assumptions. Third,
confronting the falsity of the assumptions must upend this normative
prescription, yet identify a productive path for further normative inquiry.
Figure 1 summarizes these core ingredients for the Coase Theorem:
Figure 1: The Coase Theorem as Inverted Theory

A brief overview of each of these components will help to set the stage for
the additional examples examined in Part II.
A. Unrealistic Assumptions
For a theory to gain more traction when inverted than when taken at
face value, it must have at its core one or more unrealistic assumptions.
The clearest type of unrealistic assumption is one that is categorically false,
and universally understood to be so. Zero transaction costs is a paradigmatic
example. Of course, even categorically false assumptions must be relevantly
and significantly false, not just trivially or technically false, in order to
support inversion; otherwise, the assumption could stand as a reasonable
and convenient approximation of the truth. Again, the zero transaction cost
assumption fits the bill. Although there are some circumstances in which
costs are closer to zero than others, transaction costs are rarely low enough
to be irrelevant to the analysis, even if they are capable of being overcome.
Some unrealistic assumptions are contingently rather than categorically
false. Any assumption will be false in some circumstances, so contingent
falsity is insufficient on its own to make a theory amenable to inversion.
Rather, the contingently false assumption must be one that is
overwhelmingly false in the setting or settings in which it is invoked.
Sometimes a cluster of assumptions is conjunctively necessary to support a
theory, none of which is especially unlikely on its own, but the combination
of which is so rare as to make the assumption-cluster contingently false in
an overwhelming proportion of cases. This, we will argue, is the case with
the Prisoners’ Dilemma, where the full set of required structural features
rarely if ever appear in combination.
As consensus about the falsity of the relevant assumptions starts to
unravel, the case for inversion weakens. At the limit, we reach cases where
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the truth or falsity of a given assumption is hotly contested, and it is well
understood that the prescription will invert depending on which view
prevails. Consider in this context the Laffer Curve,6 which purports to
depict the relationship between the tax rate and the resulting government
revenue as an inverted U shape. The normative lesson of the Curve depends
on a contested fact—where along the curve one places our current tax
regime. If we are on the downward slope, beyond the optimal point, then
increasing taxes will decrease revenues, but if we are not yet at the optimal
point, increasing taxes will increase revenue.7 The Laffer Curve meme is
fascinating in its own right,8 but because academic debate is focused on the
empirical question of where we are on the Curve, it does not benefit from
inversion as discussed here. Rather, the theory already embeds inversion in
its structure.
B. Popular Understandings
A theory grounded in false assumptions becomes an attractive target for
inversion when it has taken on a popular intellectual life of its own that both
ignores and depends upon those assumptions. This requires, at a minimum,
that the theory’s popularized version be well-known and frequently used.
The best candidates for inversion will be the scholarly equivalent of
household names. They typically attain that status by featuring clear and
counterintuitive normative prescriptions of broad significance. This, we
believe, is true of all of the examples we discuss below.
Popular understandings are most likely to develop around workhorse
concepts that legal scholars use as basic building blocks for other arguments
or as shared assumptions in conversations. These are the set pieces that are
trotted out in first-year classes and referenced innumerable times thereafter
as students progress through their legal education. Faculty mention them
regularly and reflexively in workshops and conversations, in hallways and
over lunch. They are in the air and under our skin.
This very popularity produces much of the pressure toward sticking to
the theory’s canonical, popularized understanding, as a kind of shared
language. Incantations like “Coasean bargaining” or “Tieboutian sorting”
can instantly bridge a gap in an argument, succinctly frame a critique, or
make a student’s eyes light up with recognition. In a conversation focused
on some specific legal topic, it would seem pedantic and perhaps even
uncollegial to point out that the theory’s underpinning assumptions are
6
See Don Fullerton, Laffer Curve, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 839 (Steven N.
Durlauf, and Lawrence E. Blume, eds., 2nd ed. 2008); Mathias Traband and Harald Uhlig, The Laffer Curve
Revisited, 58 J. MONETARY ECON. 305 (2011).
7
The importance of this distinction is understood by academic economists, even if some politicians miss it.
8
See, e.g., Robert J. Shiller, Narrative Economics, 107 AM. ECON. REV. 967, 979-82 (2017).
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utterly false, and the lesson we should take from the theory is a different
one entirely from the one being referenced. One goal of this essay is to
lower the costs of invoking inverted understandings of key theories in such
discussions.
C. Upending Prescriptions
Inversion is only useful if it substantially changes the analysis
surrounding a theory, but leaves something of value. Taking seriously the
falsity of the theory’s supporting assumptions does not require that the
normative prescription always or completely reverse. Rather, what is
frequently upended is the categorical version of the prescriptive lesson.
Attention is then focused on the untrue assumptions themselves, and the
analytic leverage that can be gained from thinking carefully about the
significance and implications of their falsity.
The analytic move that we have in mind tracks the creation of an inverse
in logic from an if-then statement.9 For the Coase Theorem, we start with
this statement:
If transaction costs are zero, an efficient result will always
be reached regardless of the initial allocation of
entitlements. [And therefore legal interventions are
unnecessary to achieve efficiency].
The popularized version of the Coase Theorem downplayed the “if” clause
and instead suggested that the balance of the sentence would hold true
across a range of real-world conditions. We can reposition emphasis on the
untrue assumption by forming this inverse:
If transaction costs are not zero, an efficient result will not
always be reached regardless of the initial allocation of
entitlements. [And therefore the allocation of entitlements
can matter to efficiency].
It is worth drawing attention to the work that is done by the always in
the statements above. If we were to omit the word always from the original
statement, the inverse would be:
If transaction costs are not zero, an efficient result will not
9

See ALFRED TARSKI, INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC AND TO THE METHODOLOGY OF THE DEDUCTIVE SCIENCES
40 (Jan Tarski, ed. 1994) (4th ed.) (explaining that the inverse of the statement “if p, then q” is “if not p, then not
q”).
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That statement is obviously untrue, at least if we think that efficient results
are reached in some cases in the real world, where transaction costs are
always nonzero. Adding the “always” is an appropriate way to carry out the
inversion, because it is the categorical version of the Coase Theorem that
carries force and currency.
A related but distinct logical move can be used to counter a different
sort of categorical claim: that a specified result will follow “if and only if” a
particular condition is present—or, in other words, that the condition is both
necessary and sufficient to produce the result.10 Consider this claim about
property arrangements:
If (and only if) property is held in common (rather than in
private ownership), a resource tragedy results.
The “if and only if” specification means that the converse of the original
conditional statement is also true—an equivalence.11 The converse looks
like this:
If a resource tragedy results, property is held in common
(rather than in private ownership).
Frank Michelman (and later Michael Heller) disproved this converse
through the notion of the anticommons,12 and with it any idea that the
commons uniquely produces resource tragedies, or that private property
ownership is sufficient to avert such tragedies. Debunking such claims is
interesting and important, but it is not inversion as we use the term here.
Also distinguishable are efforts to leverage the logic of symmetry by
identifying opposite but similar possibilities that theorists or jurists have
overlooked. There are many examples of this approach, but the most
famous is Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed’s Rule 4, which observed
See id. at 29-30 (Jan Tarski, ed. 1994) (4th ed.) (explaining that “if and only if” equates to a claim that the
specified condition is necessary and sufficient).
11
Id. at 29.
12
The anticommons idea originated in Frank Michelman’s conception of a regulatory regime that would be
the “converse” of a commons. See Frank I. Michelman, Ethics, Economics, and the Law of Property, in NOMOS
XXIV: ETHICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE LAW 3, 6, 9 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1982); Frank
Michelman, Remarks at Property Panel, Association of American Law Schools: Is the Tragedy of The Common
Inevitable? 6–7 (Jan. 1985) (on file with author). Michelman showed that the potential for resource tragedies is
not dependent on the form of property holding, but on the difficulty in assembling cooperation (whether in the
form of forbearance in a commons, or in the form of permission in an anticommons). Michael Heller later built
on Michelman’s idea of the anticommons. See, e.g., MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY (2008);
Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111
HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998).
10

11-Aug-17]

INVERTED THEORIES

7

that just as a polluter might pay a victim for the right to keep polluting, so
might a victim pay an injurer to stop polluting.13 That work is also
important and interesting, but it’s not inversion within our meaning here.14
II. THEORIES RIPE FOR INVERSION
There are no doubt numerous theories that are good candidates for
inversion, and we hope this essay will prompt scholars to identify more of
them. We will focus here on four examples we are familiar with from our
past work: Nozick’s entitlement theory of distributive justice, the Tiebout
Hypothesis, Kaplow & Shavell’s theory of tax superiority, and the
Prisoners’ Dilemma. After briefly introducing each of these theories, we
will set out its popular understanding, identify the unrealistic assumptions
on which that understanding relies, and discuss the inverted version of the
theory.
Figure 2 previews what is to come by placing these four theories within
the structure established above for the Coase Theorem.
Figure 2: A Summary of Selected Inverted Theories

13
Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of
the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1116-23 (1972).
14
Nor is the fascinating Chapter 6, “Would Flipping It Work? Trying Things the Other Way Around,” in
IAN AYRES AND BARRY NALEBUFF, WHY NOT?: HOW TO USE EVERYDAY INGENUITY TO SOLVE PROBLEMS BIG
AND SMALL 115-34 (2006), which is a looser notion of generating ideas by reversing the usual order of things.
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A. Nozick’s Theory of Distribution
Robert Nozick’s 1974 book, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, offered a
counterpoint to John Rawls’s enormously influential A Theory of Justice
(1972). In it, Nozick worked out a theory of a minimal or “nightwatchman”
state that would largely limit its interventions to protecting citizens against
force and fraud, so as to facilitate consensual market transactions among
private parties. Significantly, such a state would stay out of the business of
redistribution.
Nozick’s defense of this hands-off approach to distribution is rooted in
his “entitlement theory” of distributive justice.15 This theory does not base
the legitimacy of a society’s distribution on the patterns of resources that
people end up with, but rather on the processes through which people come
to hold those resources.16 Nozick detailed the conditions that would yield a
fair distribution under his theory, which he recognized were not met in
practice.17 His philosophical exercise was instead directed at establishing
what he saw as the correct benchmark from which to evaluate distribution.
1. Popular Understanding
Both critics and fans of Nozick’s work viewed it as an apology for freemarket distributive results and as a basis for ending redistributive
programs—or at least those programs that redistributed to the poor.18
Nozick’s claim that a properly understood theory of distributive justice
eschewed any particular pattern was viewed as a defense of existing
inequalities. Although relatively few took Nozick’s full-strength
“nightwatchman” idea to heart, his libertarian arguments were marshalled in
favor of more limited attacks on “the welfare state.”
2. Unrealistic Assumptions
Nozick’s presentation of his entitlement theory begins with the
following “inductive definition”:
1. A person who acquires a holding in accordance
with the principle of justice in acquisition is
15

ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 150-82 (1974).
Id. at 153-60. See Hal R. Varian, Distributive Justice, Welfare Economics, and the Theory of Fairness, 4
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 223, 224 (1975) (“Nozick’s theory is a procedural theory; the justice of a distribution is entirely
dependent on the path used to reach it.”).
17
NOZICK, supra note 15, at 150-53.
18
See Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, Is Nozick Kicking Rawls's Ass? Intellectual Property and Social
Justice, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 563 (2007) (“Robert Nozick stands as one of the foremost intellectual antagonists
to claims for distributive justice.”).
16
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entitled to that holding.
2. A person who acquires a holding in accordance
with the principle of justice in transfer, from
someone else entitled to the holding, is entitled to
the holding.
3. No one is entitled to a holding except by (repeated)
applications of 1 and 2.19
Although Nozick suggests that these three rules would cover the
distributive waterfront “[i]f the world were wholly just,”20 he also
recognizes that “[n]ot all actual situations are generated in accordance with
the two principles of justice in holdings: the principle of justice in
acquisition and the principle of justice in transfer.”21 This fact requires him
to introduce into his entitlement theory the notion of “rectification of
injustice in holdings.”22
Thus, Nozick’s entitlement theory only endorses a pure market
distribution conditional on the assumption that everyone’s holdings came
about from combinations of just acquisition and just transfer or that there
has already been proper rectification for any injustice in holdings. Any
deviations from those principles would require an intervention to bring
about the results that would have obtained had those principles been
followed—assuming it is possible to determine what that distribution would
have looked like. Of course, the principles of justice in acquisition and
transfer have been violated in dramatic and systematic ways. In the United
States, for example, today’s pattern of property holdings are affected by a
history that includes settlement-by-conquest; chattel slavery; property and
contract restrictions on women; the acquisition of family fortunes by fraud,
bribery, and other criminality; government corruption and discrimination;
and private discrimination. Consequently, it is all but unimaginable that an
American’s current holding of, say, land is the result of a chain of entirely
just acquisitions and just transfers.
By hypothesis, Nozick’s theory does not support the existing
distribution where the principles of justice in acquisition and transfer have
not been met, unless rectification has already set things right. Yet Nozick
does not argue that any existing society satisfies the principles of just
acquisition and transfer or that it has, through rectification, cured its
injustices. Instead, his principle of rectification, if taken literally, would
require uncovering past injustices and rectifying each one individually, as
by a transfer payment from the current beneficiary of the injustice to its
19

Id. at 151.
Id.
21
Id. at 152.
22
Id.
20
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victim.
Recognizing that it may be impossible to apply the principle of
rectification to perfectly offset all past injustices in acquisition and transfer,
Nozick observes that “[p]erhaps it is best to view some patterned principles
of distributive justice as rough rules of thumb meant to approximate the
general results of applying the principle of rectification of injustice.”23
And, interestingly, he suggests that if certain conditions hold, “a rough rule
of thumb for rectifying injustices might seem to be the following: organize
society so as to maximize the position of whatever group ends up least welloff in society.”24 In other words, Nozick suggests it is possible (though
perhaps implausible) to derive a Rawlsian theory of justice from his
entitlement theory.25 His larger point is that, if the principle of rectification
cannot feasibly be carried out through individual case-by-case remediation,
it may instead demand some kind of broad social program of redistribution.
Nozick goes on to add that, at least without a well-developed principle
of rectification tailored to specific facts of one society, “one cannot use the
analysis and theory presented here to condemn any particular scheme of
transfer payments, unless it is clear that no considerations of rectification of
injustice could apply to justify it.”26 Thus, the assumptions that would be
necessary in order for his entitlement theory to support a non-redistributive
state are, even in Nozick’s own view, so patently false as to make it
impossible to use the theory to criticize any actual instances of
redistribution. But of course the theory, in its popular incarnation, has been
used in just this way.27 This (mis)use may be in part due to Nozick’s
expositional choices and the way in which he allocated emphasis. As Hal
Varian explains:
The impression one gets from reading Nozick is that the
problem of rectification is somehow minor. It seems to me
that the reverse is the case: the problem of rectification is
23

NOZICK, supra note 15, at 230-31.
Id. at 231 (emphasis in original). The conditions Nozick has in mind are that, “lacking much historical
information,” we make the following two assumptions: “(1) that victims of injustice generally do worse than they
otherwise would and (2) that those from the least well-off group in the society have the highest probabilities of
being the (descendants of) victims of the most serious injustice who are owed compensation by those who
benefited from the injustices (assumed to be those better off, though sometimes perpetrators will be others in the
worst-off group).” Id.
25
Id. at 231 (noting that (“[t]his particular example may well be implausible”). See JOHN RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE 75-80 (1971) (describing the “difference principle” under which gains to society are only just
if they work to the benefit of the least advantaged); id. at 152-57 (describing the “maximin rule”).
26
NOZICK, supra note 15, at 231.
27
See, e.g., Julian Lamont and Christi Favor, "Distributive Justice", The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy
(Winter
2016
Edition),
Edward
N.
Zalta
(ed.),
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/justice-distributive/ (observing that “[a]lthough Nozick is
fairly candid about” his theory’s inability to speak to current distributive questions, “many of his supporters and
critics have ignored it and have carried on a vigorous debate as though, contrary to Nozick's own statement, his
theory can be used to evaluate the justice of current economic distributions.”).
24
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central to the issue of justice. We are interested in the
question of justice precisely because we live in an unjust
world; injustices have occurred in the past and are occurring
now. The question is what we should do about them.28
Some possible answers to that question emerge if we invert Nozick’s
theory.
3. Inverting Nozick’s Entitlement Theory
Suppose we accept Nozick’s idea that the justice of a distribution
depends on its history, but reject the claim that our particular history gives
people morally justifiable entitlements over the specific holdings that they
currently have. The principle of rectification would, as we have already
seen, flip the advice about the state’s role in addressing distribution. Instead
of “if all past holdings and transfers were just (or have been fully rectified
where not just), then the current distribution is just,” the proper lesson is
“because not all past holdings and transfers were just (and the injustices
have not been fully rectified), the current distribution is not just.” Flipping
the theory carries both backward-looking and forward-looking implications.
Looking back at the history of injustice in acquisition and transfer
(unaccompanied by anything like full rectification) establishes that current
holdings are not just. Although unwinding each specific injustice is
impossible, systematic past injustices that are reflected in current
distributive patterns would, on this account, call for distributive
interventions that are motivated not by a desire to create a more pleasing
distributive pattern, but rather by the imperative to rectify—in at least a
rough way—the past injustices that the current patterns reflect.
Flipping the theory, rather than simply rejecting it outright, also carries
forward-looking lessons about distribution.29 At the broadest level,
Nozick’s theory suggests that it matters how people came to possess the
things they have. This lesson resonates with scholarship suggesting that
legal outcomes cannot be evaluated independent of the processes that
brought them about.30 Significantly, some processes of distribution draw
tighter connections between desert and payoffs than others. If the history of
28

Varian, supra note 16, at 227.
These lessons turn out to be sharply at odds with the standard law and economics prescription. See infra
Part II.B. (discussing Kaplow and Shavell’s theory of tax superiority).
30
See, e.g., Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, In Defense of Redistribution through Private Law, 91 MINN. L. REV.
326, 357–60 (2006) (arguing that gains and losses are evaluated based not only on their magnitudes but also on
the process by which they came about); Bruno S. Frey, Matthias Benz, & Alois Stutzer, Introducing Procedural
Utility: Not Only What, But Also How Matters, 160 J. INSTIT. AND THEOR. ECON. 377 (2004) (presenting evidence
that people care about the processes that bring about outcomes, and not just the outcomes themselves); see also
Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Taking Outcomes Seriously, Utah L. Rev. 861 (urging a broader definition of
“outcomes” that incorporates elements like the processes that produced them).
29
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holdings bears on the justice of holdings, as Nozick suggests, then
distributive policy should be sensitive not only to creating distributive
patterns but also to building distributive histories that link payments with
rationales.
On this view, a grant that is given for no reason other than to produce a
particular income pattern (e.g., to decrease the Gini coefficient)31 is
normatively different from a grant that is given to make up for a distributive
shortfall produced by government action—or inaction. Government makes
innumerable decisions, from choosing law enforcement priorities to
deciding where and how to build dams, highways, or landfills, that have
distributive consequences. Making up for those effects through concurrent
distributive efforts (whether in-kind remediations, social insurance, or direct
payments to the affected populations) maintains the link between the
rationale and the payment in a way that disconnected welfare payments
made at some other time would not. To put it a bit differently, certain ways
of arranging social policy can clarify or cloud the historical “title” that
underpins claims of entitlement on Nozick’s theory. If one subscribes to a
theory of justice that depends on accurately tracing title, then one should be
willing to invest in making that task easier to accomplish.
B. The Tiebout Hypothesis
Charles Tiebout wrote A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures as a
rejoinder to the then-conventional academic view, articulated by Richard
Musgrave and Paul Samuelson, that governmental provision of goods and
services is inherently inefficient due to intractable problems of demand
revelation.32 Musgrave and Samuelson maintained that people will
misrepresent their demand for public goods and services in hopes of freeriding on others, given the lack of any price mechanism to force them to
reveal their preferences. Tiebout recognized that in a multi-jurisdictional
metropolitan area, “consumer-voters” can select among local governments.
If each local government offers a different mix of goods and services, along
31
The Gini coefficient is a standard measure of income inequality in a society. Given a curve that
depicts the share of income earned by each income percentile (the Lorenz Curve), the Gini coefficient
describes the degree by which that curve diverges from a perfectly proportionate income dispersion. See,
e.g., LEE S. FRIEDMAN, THE MICROECONOMICS OF PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS 126–28, fig. 5-1 (2002).
Zero represents perfect equality and one represents perfect inequality (where one person receives all
national income).
32
Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POLIT. ECON. 416 (1956); see also
Wallace E. Oates, The Many Faces of the Tiebout Model, in THE TIEBOUT MODEL AT FIFTY: ESSAYS IN PUBLIC
ECONOMICS IN HONOR OF WALLACE OATES 21, 21-22 (William A. Fischel, ed., 2006) (“Tiebout’s purpose in the
paper is to show that, in principle at least, there exists a mechanism or solution to the free-rider problem for a
specific class of public goods—namely, local public goods.”). Oates goes on to argue that Tiebout meant to offer
more “than just a formulation of a preference-revealing algorithm” insofar as “he does at various points try to
justify and explain his model in terms of ‘real’ behavior.” Id. at 22.
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with associated tax burdens, the person who is choosing where to live can
be analogized to a shopper who is selecting among different baskets and
price points—if certain strong and unrealistic assumptions hold.
The theoretical point, which came to be known as the Tiebout
Hypothesis, was a powerful one: it showed how entry and exit could
substitute for a price mechanism and reveal information about preferences
as consumer-voters “voted with their feet.”33 Over the last six decades, the
idea has become a mainstay of local government analysis. However, at least
in legal academia, its primary thrust has morphed from an analytic point
about methods of demand revelation to a normative point about local
autonomy and consumer choice.
1. Popular Understanding
The Tiebout Hypothesis (TH) is broadly associated with the positive
claim that people sort into the communities that suit them best, and that the
communities shape themselves to compete for consumer-voters. This
corresponds to a normative claim: that local governments should have
autonomy, so as to induce optimal sorting.34 Although typically addressed
to local government autonomy at the municipal level, it has also been cited
in connection with smaller subunits such as private communities.35
The normative use of TH takes on particular significance in the context
of local land use controls, where it is often invoked.36 The claim might
simply be that people will wish to sort themselves among communities
based on their preferences for particular land use policies (which can affect
density, architecture, city layout, and so on), just like they might wish to
Wallace Oates greatly raised the visibility of Tiebout’s work among economists in 1969 when he
published an empirical study testing the degree of capitalization of tax-service packages into home prices. Wallace
E. Oates, The Effects of Property Taxes and Public Spending on Property Values: An Empirical Study of Tax
Capitalization and the Tiebout Hypothesis, 77 J. POLIT. ECON. 957 (1969); see William A. Fischel, Footloose at
Fifty: An Introduction to the Tiebout Anniversary Essays, in THE TIEBOUT MODEL AT FIFTY, supra note 32, at 1, 5
(describing the effects of Oates’s 1969 publication).
34
See, e.g., Richard Briffault, The Rise of Sublocal Structures in Urban Governance, 82 Minn. L. Rev. 503
(1997) (“The dominant law and economics model of local government, based on the work of Charles M. Tiebout,
assumes that decentralization of power to local governments promotes the efficient delivery of public goods and
services.”); Nestor M. Davidson & Sheila R. Foster, The Mobility Case for Regionalism, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
63, 73 (2013) (“[S]cholars regularly invoke the Tiebout model to support arguments for devolution and
decentralization.”). These normative claims attached to the Tiebout Hypothesis can be distinguished from the
writings of Tiebout himself. See Davidson & Foster, supra, at 73 n. 31 (“The proliferation of structural
prescriptions associated with Tieboutian localism is akin to the outgrowth of a kind of normative Coaseanism that
is arguably removed from Ronald Coase’s actual work—what Robert Ellickson contrasted as the cardboard Coase
and the real Coase.”) (citing Ellickson, supra note 5, at 612-13).
35
See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1519, 1547-48
(1982). Tieboutian logic has also been extended to the analysis of states within a federal system. See, e.g.,
Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Compared to What? Tiebout and the Comparative Merits of Congress and the States in
Constitutional Federalism, in THE TIEBOUT MODEL AT FIFTY, supra note 32, at 239.
36
See, e.g., William A. Fischel, Footloose at Fifty: An Introduction to the Tiebout Anniversary Essays, in
THE TIEBOUT MODEL AT FIFTY, supra note 32, at 1, 18 (“Scholarly discussions of land use regulation do not go
far before invoking the Tiebout model.”).
33
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sort themselves based on any other local policy. But zoning plays a unique
role in supporting the TH’s shopping metaphor. Without zoning, in-movers
could obtain the same local services at a lower tax price by adding cheaper
homes;37 zoning can enforce an equal property tax burden by requiring
everyone to consume a minimum amount of housing.38
Yet zoning does not just enforce equal tax burdens within a given
community consume, it also heavily influences who can move into the
community. For example, if the only types of housing stock that the
municipality’s zoning ordinance permits are single-family homes on sizable
lots and luxury studio apartments, low-income people with children are
locked out. The popular TH supports zoning that undermines mobility and
free choice of some citizens, even though those same characteristics of
mobility and choice lie at the heart of TH’s popular appeal.
2. Unrealistic Assumptions
Tiebout developed his novel intuition that consumer-voters could shop
for a local government “by postulating an extreme model” that made several
explicit assumptions.39 In addition to assuming perfect mobility and full
knowledge on the part of consumer-voters, Tiebout’s model assumed that
employment played no role in anyone’s locational choice; rather, he
“assumed that all persons are living on dividend income.”40 And, perhaps
most crucial and unrealistic of all, Tiebout’s model assumed that “[t]he
public services supplied exhibit no external economies or diseconomies
between communities.”41
As Tiebout recognized, the unrealistic nature of these assumptions
placed limits on his theory’s implications. For example, externalities
produced by law enforcement in particular jurisdictions might call for at
least some functions to be handled at a more centralized level. The mobility
assumption is also sharply limited by, among other things, the real world
demands of employment and the need for proximity to particular people or
firms for other reasons.42 In addition, zoning has the effect of altering
opportunities for mobility.
37

See Bruce W. Hamilton, Zoning and Property Taxation in a System of Local Governments, 12 URB. STUD.
205 (1975) (explaining that Tiebout’s idea of shopping for local services required some way of stabilizing the
prices that residents and would-be residents confront through taxation—which zoning could provide).
38
See id. Hamilton later refined his argument to explain that the level of housing consumption did not have
to be uniform across the jurisdiction for a Tieboutian pricing system to work—it was only necessary that housing
supply be fixed so that the tax bargain could be properly capitalized into the price of homes. Bruce W. Hamilton,
Capitalization of Intrajurisdictional Differences in Local Tax Prices, 66 AM. ECON. REV. 743 (1976); see also
WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 68-69 (2001).
39
Tiebout, supra note 32, at 419.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
See David Schleicher, The City as a Law and Economic Subject, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1507 (noting
tensions between sorting and agglomeration).

11-Aug-17]

INVERTED THEORIES

15

These limits did not, however, change Tiebout’s theoretical point that if
it were possible to move closer to the world of the assumptions, it would
also be possible to improve the efficiency of government. Yet Tiebout’s
important observations about demand revelation lie far from the normative
propositions generally associated with TH: that local governments should
be given free rein in order to induce optimal sorting. Focusing on Tiebout’s
original point leads us instead to a different, inverted interpretation of TH.
3. Inverting the Tiebout Hypothesis
To begin, note that under Tiebout’s model, sorting is a means to an end,
not an end in itself: it is through the process of sorting into communities
that people register their preferences for different goods and services. The
quality of the information that is revealed through this process is only as
good as the sorting itself can make it. Every barrier to mobility, every
obfuscation of information about services and costs, and every externality
that attenuates the connection between what is paid and what is received,
makes location choices that much less revealing.
Restoring the emphasis on demand revelation flips TH from its usual
orientation. The popular version of TH holds that each local government
must remain free to set its own policies (including exclusionary land use
policies) without restraint, so that people—people with perfect mobility,
that is—can sort into their preferred communities. This gets things
backwards. The flipped version of TH suggests that public policy should
work to improve the conditions of mobility for everyone, increase
awareness of the implications of various policies, and address
interdependencies among communities so that the implicit price signals sent
by moves are accurate ones. As Tiebout himself put it, “Policies that
promote residential mobility and increase the knowledge of the consumervoter will improve the allocation of government expenditures in the same
sense that mobility among jobs and knowledge relevant to the location of
industry and labor improve the allocation of private resources.”43
An inverted TH looks at ways to improve the shadow market of local
government so that its performance with respect to public goods can
approach the private market’s performance with respect to private goods.
What would this inverted perspective entail? For one thing, examining the
ways in which local governmental policies impose costs on other local
governments, as through exclusionary housing policies that increase
education and social service burdens elsewhere, and environmental policies
that place costs (such as those associated with landfills) elsewhere. But
more foundationally, it would involve examining how all households can be
43

Tiebout, supra note 32, at 423.
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given meaningful choices among local jurisdictions, whether through
enhanced voucher programs that open up more housing options in more
places, policies to alter the amount and variety of housing stock across
jurisdictions, or through other mechanisms that give low-income people
realistic opportunities to self-sort based on their preferences.44 Sorting
based on what one likes and values is attractive, but the popular TH
primarily promotes economic stratification among communities—
something that cuts against rather than in favor of meaningful choice and
mobility.
C. Kaplow & Shavell’s Theory of Tax Superiority
Kaplow and Shavell, building on earlier economic treatments of
commodity taxation, developed a formal model showing the advantages of
conducting all redistribution through tax-and-transfer (hereinafter “tax”)
rather than through legal rules.45 The intuition behind their formal model
relies on minimizing distortions to behavior. Moving money through the
tax system is well known to produce distortions in the choice between labor
and leisure, which had caused some legal scholars to suggest that using
legal rules could be a preferable alternative.46 Kaplow and Shavell argued
that redistributive legal rules would embed an equivalent labor-leisure
distortion, because rational actors would understand that, just as in the
realm of taxation, having a higher or lower income would harm or benefit
them.47 However, legal rules would also distort choices about the primary
behavior that is being regulated. For example, a tort rule that granted higher
recoveries to low-income people and assessed higher damages against highincome people would distort choices about taking care.48
Thus, under the Kaplow and Shavell model, moving a quantum of
money through tax would cost less in terms of distortions than moving that
44
Significantly, it is not actually necessary to have homogeneous housing stock (with similar property tax
burdens) throughout a jurisdiction to determine how much people value local public goods and services. What is
important is that the tax price be capitalized into the housing cost, which can occur even with heterogeneous
housing stock, although it does require a constraint on supply to enable capitalization to occur. See supra note 38
45
See Steven Shavell, A Note on Efficiency vs. Distributional Equity in Legal Rulemaking: Should
Distributional Equity Matter Given Optimal Income Taxation?, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 414 (1981); Louis Kaplow &
Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient Than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J.
LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Less Efficient]; Kaplow & Shavell, Should Legal Rules
Favor the Poor? Clarifying the Role of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 29 J. LEGAL
STUD. 821, 825-34 (2000) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Legal Rules]; Louis Kaplow, The Optimal Supply of
Public Goods and the Distortionary Cost of Taxation, 49 NAT’L TAX J. 513 (1996). A key antecedent in the
economics literature was Anthony B. Atkinson and Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Design of Tax Structure: Direct Versus
Indirect Taxation, 6 J. PUB. ECON. 55 (1976).
46
See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and
Damage Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1075, 1084–85 (1980) (observing that “[d]ue to the substantial distortions
in work effort, redistribution through the tax system would be quite costly in terms of efficiency”).
47
See, e.g., Kaplow & Shavell, Less Efficient, supra note 45, at 667–68.
48
See id. But see Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economic Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51 Vand. L.
REV. 1653 (1998) (disputing this equivalence based on cognitive biases).
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same amount of money through the design of a legal rule. Thus, it is
possible for everyone to be made better off by shifting all redistribution into
the domain of tax.49 Kaplow and Shavell accompanied this formal vision of
tax superiority with policy advice that has become associated with the
popular understanding of their work: that welfarists should ignore the
distributive consequences of legal rules, except within the realm of tax.50
1. Popular Understanding
Kaplow and Shavell’s theory can be understood in (at least) two very
different ways.51 One way focuses on the formal result—that any given
increment of redistribution can be accomplished at lower cost (in terms of
behavioral distortions) through tax than through legal rules. But this claim
of “formal tax superiority” has been thoroughly overshadowed by what we
call “prescriptive tax superiority.”52 This understanding of Kaplow and
Shavell maintains that legal rules should never take distribution into
account, but should instead be shaped entirely by efficiency considerations.
Such an approach leaves all redistribution to the tax system, where (by
hypothesis) it can be accomplished at lower cost.
Prescriptive tax superiority has become dominant in law and
economics.53 The idea that distribution is best left to tax has become so
mainstream that it often arises in classrooms, workshops, and written
scholarship without specific attribution. This categorical prescription might
at first appear to be a logical and indeed inevitable extension of formal tax
superiority. But on closer examination, the move between these two flavors
of tax superiority depends on a crucial assumption—that it is politically no
easier to achieve redistribution through one mechanism rather than another.
2. Unrealistic Assumption
Critics of Kaplow and Shavell’s theory have noted that redistribution
through tax may be politically infeasible, which might seem to argue for
considering legal rules as an alternative redistributive mechanism. Few of
these critics have focused on Kaplow and Shavell’s response to this point,
however. That response, which can be found in scattered observations in
49

See, e.g., Kaplow & Shavell, Less Efficient, supra note 45
Id. at 677.
51
These alternative interpretations are emphasized in Lee Anne Fennell & Richard H. McAdams, The
Distributive Deficit in Law and Economics, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1051, 1058-68 (2016).
52
See id. at 1062-65.
53
See, e.g., id. at 1062 n. 32 (collecting cites); Kyle Logue & Ronen Avraham, Redistributing Optimally: Of
Tax Rules, Legal Rules, and Insurance, 56 TAX L. REV. 157, 158 (2003) (“[W]e believe it is a safe bet that a
majority of legal economists hold the following view: Whatever amount of redistribution is deemed appropriate or
desirable, the exclusive policy tool for redistributing to reduce income or wealth inequality should always be the
tax-and-transfer system.”).
50
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Kaplow and Shavell’s solo and joint work, is that any political impediments
to redistribution through the tax system will also block, to an equal extent,
efforts to redistribute through legal rules. If a court or legislature does
manage to produce a legal rule that alters distribution to a greater degree
than could be achieved through tax, Kaplow and Shavell suggest that the
victory for the winners will be short-lived: Congress will simply offset what
has been done to regain its preferred distributive pattern.54
In other words, Kaplow and Shavell suggest that no legal actor will be
able to “get away with” trying to redistribute to a greater degree than
Congress’s own preferences allow. Therefore, one should redistribute
through tax; if the distributive pattern is essentially inevitable, all that one
can do is raise the cost of achieving it by trying to make use of a non-tax
distributive method. We refer to this claim as one of “distributive
invariance.”55 Although Kaplow and Shavell do not set out distributive
invariance as a formal assumption (which distinguishes this example from
the prior two), it is nonetheless critical to their claim of prescriptive tax
superiority.56
Yet, as we once argued at length, the assumption is false.57 It would be
true only if the costs associated with the political resistance to
redistribution—“political action costs”—were equal across all modes of
redistribution. And, for many reasons, it may be more difficult politically to
move money through the tax system than through a substantive legal rule.
For example, legislative inertia and entrenchment may prevent Congress
from changing the distributive pattern.58
Significantly, the false assumption of distributive invariance underpins
the shift from formal tax superiority to prescriptive tax superiority. 59 If one
can get different distributive results by using legal rules instead of or in
addition to tax, it would no longer be clear that tax is the exclusively
preferred method. This is because in a welfarist analysis, both efficiency
and distribution matter.60 Whatever efficiency losses legal rules might
produce through greater behavioral distortions might be more than made up
for by their capacity to enhance distribution. It is therefore untrue that it is
always best, regardless of one’s distributive goals, to pursue those goals
54

See, e.g., Kaplow & Shavell, Less Efficient, supra note 45 at 675.
See generally Fennell & McAdams, supra note 51
56
To some degree, they acknowledge as much. See Shavell, supra note 45, at 417; see also, Kaplow &
Shavell, Less Efficient, supra note 45, at 675.
57
See Fennell & McAdams, supra note 38. Circumstantial evidence for the falsity of invariance can be
found in the tax system’s pervasive non-responsiveness to changes in material inequality. See KENNETH SCHEVE
AND DAVID STASAVAGE, TAXING THE RICH: A HISTORY OF FISCAL FAIRNESS IN THE UNITED STATES AND
EUROPE (2016) (examining the history of twenty nations over two centuries and finding that rising inequality was
virtually never sufficient to cause the government to raise taxes on the rich).
58
Fennell & McAdams, supra note 51, at 1078-1108.
59
Id. at 1069-71.
60
Distribution matters both because material inequality adversely affects welfare in various ways and
because welfare economics is open to the use of social welfare functions that value equality of welfare. See id.
55
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through the tax system rather than through legal rules. In some cases, the
opposite advice would be better.
3. Inverting the Theory of Tax Superiority
Suppose we approached the theory of tax superiority with an
appreciation for the fact that political costs can vary among modes of
distribution—that is with an understanding that the assumption of
distributive invariance is false. Kaplow and Shavell’s theory of formal tax
superiority would remain intact, showing that—in theory—there are always
gains to be had by shifting more distributive work to the tax arena. But
prescriptive tax superiority no longer holds. Instead of: “If the pattern of
distribution is invariant to the means of redistribution, then it is always
optimal to address distribution only through tax (and not through other legal
rules),” we get: “Because the pattern of distribution varies with the means
of redistribution, it is not always optimal to address distribution only
through tax (rather than through other legal rules).”
Inversion invites several generative lines of inquiry. For starters, it
highlights the importance of studying the political barriers to redistributing
through different modes, similar to the focus on transaction costs that
followed Coase’s theoretical breakthrough. As Nobel Laureate James
Heckman has recognized, law and economics is “analytically incomplete”
because it lacks “a satisfactory framework within which to analyze
redistribution.”61 He elaborates: “A fully satisfactory analysis would require
a careful accounting of the politics of redistribution and the gap between
ideal policies and those that are actually used by governments as they
emerge from political compromises.”62 The assertion of invariance obviates
the need to examine the politics of distribution and therefore blocks the
necessary analysis. The inversion of the Kaplow & Shavell thesis
recognizes the centrality of political action costs, opening the way to the
analysis Heckman describes.
From there, work might proceed in a number of possible directions. One
approach would involve studying the efficacy of particular legal rules at
achieving welfare-enhancing distributive improvements and considering
whether these gains are uniquely achievable through that method (i.e., are
otherwise politically infeasible). If so, the question becomes whether the
welfare improvements outweigh the losses caused by the behavioral
distortions of the inefficient rule.63 Another line of research might consider
61
See James J. Heckman, The Intellectual Roots of the Law and Economics Movement, 15 LAW & HIST.
REV. 327, 332 (1997).
62
Id.
63
For some examples of legal rules that may have both efficiency and distributive consequences, see Fennell
& McAdams, supra note 51, at 1065-68 (discussing examples of arbitration clauses, teacher tenure, military
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how psychological biases, framing, or perceptions of fairness interact with
different modes of distribution and consider whether there are design
features that might be tweaked to make redistribution through tax work
better. Explicitly linking legal rules that have distributive consequences
with particular transfers that can be carried out through the tax system
might be one way to harness the fairness and desert intuitions that might
accompany redistribution through legal rules.
Recognizing the potential for variable distributive results through
different mechanisms also opens up significant institutional questions.
Should particular institutions be given priority in determining distributive
policy? If different governmental actors subscribe to different social welfare
functions (some of which weight equality more heavily than others), whose
vision should be allowed to prevail? For welfarists, answering these
questions requires considering not only the impacts of behavioral distortions
and distributive patterns on welfare, but also whether there are any welfare
implications associated with privileging a particular institutional actor in the
distributive arena.
D. The Prisoners’ Dilemma
Unlike the prior examples, the Prisoners’ Dilemma is not an
independent theory; it is a particular application of game theory.
Nonetheless, by generalizing lessons from legal scholars’ many specific
uses of the Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD) in a vast literature across many
domains of law, we can articulate what has become an implicit theory.64
In the vivid story by which this abstract game gets its name, a
prosecutor creates a PD by making each of two prisoners the same offer
(where each prisoner knows the offer is made to both of them): “If you both
confess, I will give you both a lenient sentence of 3 years in prison; if you
both remain silent, I only have evidence to convict you of a minor crime
and you will each serve 1 year in prison; if one of you confesses and the
other remains silent, the confessor will walk free, while the non-confessor
will get no leniency and serve 7 years.” Here is the decision matrix that the
prisoners confront, as it is typically presented:

recruitment, criminal enforcement, and environmental regulation).
64
As one of us previously reported, a 2009 Westlaw search in the Journals & Law Reviews (JLR) database
for "prisoner's dilemma" or "prisoners dilemma" (which also retrieves “prisoners’ dilemma”) resulted in 3119
documents. See Richard H. McAdams, Beyond the Prisoners’ Dilemma: Coordination, Game Theory, and Law,
82 S. CAL. LAW REV. 209, 214 n.14 (2009). Westlaw appears to have changed its libraries slightly, but the same
search more recently (July 7, 2017) in the Law Reviews & Journals database retrieved 4531 documents. Ten
articles in just the last 5 years (since 2011) contain the term “prisoner’s dilemma” or “prisoners’ dilemma” in the
title.
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Table 1: Prisoners’ Dilemma (Payoffs for Rohn, Colin)

Rohn Remains Silent
Rohn Confesses

Colin Remains Silent
(-1, -1)
(0, -7)

Colin Confesses
(-7, 0)
(-3, -3)

Rohn does best to confess if Colin confesses (getting 3 years rather than
7), and best to confess if Colin remains silent (getting 0 years instead of 1)).
Colin is in exactly the same position: he does best confessing no matter
what Rohn does. Thus, both prisoners confess (“defect”) and do 3 years in
prison, though they would both gain if they could both remain silent
(“cooperate”) and receive 1 year.
This “both defect” prediction is driven by the particular assumptions
built into the structure of the game. Far from being treated as an odd puzzle
that might arise under rarified circumstances, however, the PD game has
been widely used in legal theory, by law professors and political scientists,
to build a normative case for legal intervention.
1. Popular Understanding
At its core, the PD is understood to justify the use of law to solve
problems of cooperation.65 First, the PD shows that cooperation is
impossible because the dominant strategy is to defect. Second, the PD
shows that legal sanctions can “solve” the problem of cooperation in a way
that makes everyone better off.66 (We set aside here situations where third
parties are harmed, such as potential victims who would prefer that
criminals be punished for their crimes). Scholars’ applications of the PD to
law are legion even though, as we will see, all of the strong assumptions
built into the game are rarely true at the same time.67 Applications include
65
Some have previously dissented from what we describe here as the popular view. See McAdams, supra
note 64; Wayne Eastman, Telling Alternative Stories: Heterodox Versions of the Prisoners’ Dilemma, the Coase
Theorem, and Supply-Demand Equilibrium, 29 CONN. L. REV. 727, 740 (1997) (“The message of the standard
Prisoners’ Dilemma is not simply that self-interested parties will fail to achieve optimal outcomes, but that selfinterested parties given the ability to make agreements and a functioning contract law system will achieve
optimum outcomes, and that self-interested parties engaging in repeated interactions may well do so.”). These
understandings, which line up in some ways with the inversion of the PD we discuss below, seem to be
overshadowed by the more gloomy interpretations we emphasize.
66
There are various ways that the law can change the payoffs to alter the dominant strategy from one of
universal defection to one of universal cooperation, whether by sanctioning defection, subsidizing cooperation, or
otherwise altering the relative attractiveness of the alternatives.
67
The same might be said of the multi-player version of the PD, the Tragedy of the Commons. See, e.g.,
ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 35(1990) (noting structural equivalence between the PD and the Tragedy of the Commons); Lee Anne Fennell,
Commons, Anticommons, Semicommons, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW 35,
36 (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. Smith, eds., 2011) (noting that the standard presentation of the tragedy features
conditions that make cooperation more likely). Like the PD, the Tragedy of the Commons is a staple of legal
scholarship. A recent Westlaw search (July 7, 2017) for “tragedy of the commons” in Law Reviews & Journals
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contracts,68 corporate law,69 banking,70 international law,71 the federal
judiciary,72 and civil discovery.73
2. Unrealistic Assumptions
The prediction that the PD players will fail to reach the mutually
desirable outcome – that they will defect rather than cooperate – is based on
several strong assumptions. As a general matter, game theory assumes that
the players are perfectly rational and perfectly self-interested. The classic
PD game further assumes a peculiar payoff structure that both makes joint
defection dominant but that would also deliver mutual gains to the parties if
joint cooperation could be achieved. It is also assumed that the players
interact against each other in the game only once.
These assumptions produce two positive claims that are crucial to the
popular version of the PD: First, that people cannot cooperate, and second,
that forcing them to choose the cooperative solution (through law) will
improve everyone’s payoffs. Together, these positive claims support the
normative prescription to intervene through law whenever a PD is afoot.
These are highly demanding assumptions. A PD is only present if the
conditions mentioned above hold true in combination, and they will do so
only rarely. To see why the PD a relatively rare game structure to
encounter in the real world, it’s important to consider some of the ways that
the assumptions can fail to hold, especially in combination.
To begin, consider the singular payoff ordering necessary for a PD. The
PD arises when and only when each player ranks the outcomes as follows:

yielded 3537 documents.
68
See, e.g., Robert L. Birmingham, The Duty to Disclose and the Prisoner's Dilemma: Laidlaw
v. Oregon, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 249, 275-82 (1988); Robert E. Scott, Conflict and Cooperation in LongTerm Contracts, 75 CAL. L. REV. 2005 (1987).
69
See, e.g., Steven H. Kropp, Corporate Governance, Executive Compensation, Corporate Performance,
and Worker Rights in Bankruptcy: Some Lessons from Game Theory, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (2007).
70
Several scholars describe bank runs as PDs. See e.g., Mark E. Van Der Weide & Satish M. Kini,
Subordinated Debt: A Capital Markets Approach to Bank Regulation, 41 B.C. L. REV. 195, 201 (2000); Daniel R.
Fischel, Andrew M. Rosenfield & Robert S. Stillman, The Regulation of Banks and Bank Holding Companies, 73
VA. L. REV. 301, 307-10 (1987); Jonathan R. Macey, The Business of Banking: Before and After Gramm-LeachBliley, 25 J. CORP. L. 691, 696-97 (2000).
71
See, e.g., Maya Steinitz and Paul Gowder, Transnational Litigation as a Prisoner's Dilemma, 94 N.C.
LAW REV. 751 (2016); George Norman & Joel P. Trachtman, The Customary International Law Game, 99 AM. J.
INT’L L. 541, 548-53 (2005).
72
See, e.g., David S. Law, Appointing Federal Judges: The President, the Senate, and the Prisoner's
Dilemma, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 479, 502-04 (2005); Thomas W. Merrill, Pluralism, the Prisoner's Dilemma, and
the Behavior of the Independent Judiciary, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 396, 401-09 (1993).
73
See, e.g., Paul W. Grimm and Heather Leigh Williams, “The [Judicial] Beatings Will Continue until
Morale Improves”: the Prisoner's Dilemma of Cooperative Discovery and Proposals for Improved Morale, 43 U.
BALT. LAW FORUM 107 (2013); Mitchell London, Resolving the Civil Litigant’s Discovery Dilemma, 26 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 837 (2013).
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1. Best to defect when the other cooperates;
2. Second best when both cooperate;
3. Third best when both defect; and
4. Fourth best (worst) to cooperate when the other defects.
Note that what matters here is how the players subjectively rank the
outcomes, not the number of years (or dollars, or any other objective
metric) associated with each outcome. For example, if a person values
“beating the prosecutor” as an end, or has reason to care how much time the
other prisoner spends incarcerated, then the above prosecutor’s deal may
not create a PD. A change in the rank order of any two outcomes converts
the game into something other than a PD, such as one of the other wellknown two-by-two games with entirely different properties.74 In these other
games, rational and selfish players may cooperate without legal sanctions.
The PD structure creates the prospect of mutual gains from cooperation
(or forced cooperation through law). Yet, most real-world situations have
both winners and losers, even when solving a collective action problem.
Take the simple example of overfishing, an instance of the tragedy of the
commons. Everyone appears to lose if the fish in the common lake are
depleted; everyone appears to gain if there are sufficient limits to preserve a
stable population of fish. Yet some people might face an endgame problem:
if they are happy to leave the area when the pool is depleted, they might be
worse off by the limitation on fishing. And then there is the problem where
there is more than one way to define the limits. One might just limit the
number of fish per person. But if monitoring each fish caught is costly, an
alternative might be to limit fishing technology – the size of a boat or boat
net – factors that are highly observable. Assume that the tradeoffs make the
two regulations equally efficient. Nonetheless, those whose business model
depends on the scale economies of a larger-than-permitted boat or net may
find that they cannot continue fishing if the equipment limit is chosen—
making them worse off than if they had been free to exploit the fish supply
without constraint until it collapsed.
A final assumption is that the game is one-shot. The PD might be oneshot because the situation is entirely one-of-a-kind for that individual. Yet,
if the person has never encountered a context like the one he is in, he might
not recognize its strategic essence is the PD. Though players would likely
learn through repeated interactions, repetition makes cooperation more
likely. When the PD game is iterated – when two individuals engage in an
indefinite repetition of PD interactions – cooperation can and does
74

See RICHARD H. MCADAMS, THE EXPRESSIVE POWERS OF LAW: THEORIES AND LIMITS 29-39 (2015). As
one example, if the rank of the first and second alternatives flip for both players the situation becomes an
Assurance game in which a selfish player might rationally choose to cooperate. Id. at 39.
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emerge.75
Indeed, even people who are actually in a one-shot game are often
uncertain that the game will actually prove to be one-shot, or they may fear
reputational sanctions that transfer across one-shot interactions. For
example, if the players are an Uber driver and passenger, they may decide
to cooperate because the ratings each generates of the other affects their
future interactions, even if the two people will never see each other again.
It is also assumed that the players are perfectly self-interested, driven
neither by altruism or animosity toward their opponents. There are many
ways this assumption might fail. For example, at least outside of perfectly
anonymous interactions, the knowledge that another player might become
angry at one’s selected strategy (even if the other player cannot retaliate)
might be enough to alter the perceived payoffs in a real world setting and
change the PD into a different game entirely.76
Because the full set of conditions for a PD are rarely met
simultaneously, the assumptions that follow from that game structure are
very often false. This makes the theory ripe for inversion.
3. Inverting Prisoners’ Dilemma Theory
One might invert the PD theory in two ways. First, if the PD were the
primary justification for law, one might use the theory to demonstrate how
infrequently law is necessary. If the assumptions that collectively suggest
people cannot cooperate are rarely fully met, they will rarely need law to
induce them to cooperate.77 The same inversion might focus our attention
on how to ensure that the conditions for cooperation – the absence of the
PD – exist. This is what Elinor Ostrom’s work did with respect to the
multi-player version of the Prisoners’ Dilemma, the Tragedy of the
Commons.78 By examining design principles that enable long-term
75
See, e.g., ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984); Charles Holt, Cathleen Johnson,
and David Schmidtz, “Prisoner’s Dilemma Experiments,” in THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA 243-264 (Martin
Peterson, ed., 2015). Later work uses evolutionary methodology to explain the emergence of cooperation. See,
e.g., ROBERT AXELROD, THE COMPLEXITY OF COOPERATION (1997). In theory, iteration can unravel if people
know exactly how many rounds will be played, due to what game theory calls “backward induction.” Players
reason that they will defect in the last round n, which means there is no reason to cooperate in round n -1.
Expecting mutual defection in round n -1, there is no reason to cooperate in round n -2, and so on, to the first
round. Nonetheless, if people are a little less than perfectly rational, or doubt that others are fully rational, they
might not work through this logic; they might cooperate in at least in the early rounds of a lengthy set of
interactions. See Philip Pettit and Robert Sugden, The Backward Induction Paradox, 86 J. PHIL. 169 (1989);
David Kreps, Paul Milgrom, John Roberts and Robert Wilson, Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated
Prisoner's Dilemma, 27 J. ECON. THEORY, 245 (1982).
76
Even among perfect strangers who know they will never interact again, the emotion of shame or the desire
for esteem may motivate cooperation in a PD. See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and
Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH L. REV. 338 (1997).
77
Perhaps people need law for other purposes, such as redistribution, but this justification is not supported
by the PD.
78
See generally OSTROM, supra note 67.
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cooperative solutions, the focus was taken off the need for government
coercion or strong private property rights as the inevitable solutions.79
There is a second way to invert PD theory. The constructed theory
suggests that legal intervention is uncontroversially normatively justified
because solving the PD creates only winners. An intervention to solve a
classic PD easily satisfies the principle of Pareto efficiency because it
makes at least one person (in fact, both people) better off, and makes no one
worse off. But if the PD is the leading exemplar for when law can make
Pareto-superior improvements, the inverted theory emphasizes how
infrequently such moves are possible in the real world. Instead, we must
almost always decide how to trade off gains against losses, winners against
losers—something that cannot be done through simple allegiance to Pareto
efficiency. Just as there are no free lunches, there are no normative
cakewalks.
In short, the uninverted PD theory makes the normative issue seem
simpler than it is. The inverted theory says that it will be rarely be the case
that solving a cooperation problem is Pareto-efficient. What the inverted
theory pushes us to recognize about the situation is the inevitability of
difficult distributive judgments. Nor will it do to suggest that the answers
to these distributive questions are unimportant or can be safely ignored, on
the grounds that tax and transfer can address any distributive shortfalls. As
we saw in the inversion of the K&S theory above, that response relies on
another set of false assumptions.
III. THE VALUE AND LIMITS OF INVERSION
Inverting a theory is different from critiquing it on its own terms or
rejecting it outright. The theory inverter sees something valuable in the
connections the theory makes between variables, despite the lack of
alignment between the theory’s supporting assumptions and reality, and
works to extract and apply that lesson in manner consonant with real-world
conditions. But inversion can raise some concerns of its own, as we will
explain.
A. Inversion and Other Critiques
In thinking about the significance of the inversion exercise, it is helpful
to consider how inverting a theory is different from engaging in other kinds
of critiques, including rejecting the premises of the theory outright,
watering it down, or attaching warning labels to it. Inversion differs from
other forms of critique in that it grants (at least for purposes of discussion)
79

See id.
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everything claimed by the theory except the false assumption under
scrutiny. In the examples above, it was possible to grant the internal logic of
the theoretical claim while turning attention to the falsity of the assumption
that linked that logic to a normative takeaway.
It is of course possible to attack such theories in other ways. For
example, Nozick’s entitlement theory might be rejected on the grounds that
some patterns of holdings are unacceptable regardless of how they came
about.80 The Tiebout Hypothesis might be rejected on a view of human
nature that distinguishes the preferences of a citizen from her acts of
consumption.81 And Kaplow and Shavell’s theory of tax superiority might
be rejected on the grounds that they are just wrong about the extra distortion
argument.82 Alternatively, a theory’s punchline might be watered down in
various ways by introducing exceptions and qualifications.83 Or competing
narratives might be attached to its central framework in an effort to broaden
or challenge its takeaways.84
Another alternative to inversion might be termed the “warning label”
approach. Here, theorists or later commentators might apply a “use only as
directed” warning to ideas, stressing that the theory cannot be applied in
situations where the specified assumptions do not hold true to even a rough
or approximate degree. As this description suggests, the warning label is
best suited to theories that might be applied across a wide range of contexts,
at least some of which feature conditions that are relatively close to those
stated in the assumptions. The Coase Theorem is sometimes qualified in
this way, where low transaction cost settings are thought to be close enough
to a zero transaction cost world to validate the conclusion that efficiency
will be reached. But as that example shows, it is often unclear what is going
to count as “close enough”: zero transaction costs turn out on closer
inspection to have a truly other-worldly character that cannot be said to very
closely resemble any real situations.85
When the validating assumptions represent dramatic and pervasive
departures from reality, a warning is unlikely to be of much use. A proviso
that effectively tells readers “don’t try this at home—or, actually, anywhere
else in the real world” invites one of two responses. The first response is to
Or that a variety of more subtle problems exist in Nozick’s arguments. See, e.g., the essays in THE
CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO NOZICK'S ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (Ralf M. Bader and John Meadowcroft, eds.,
2011).
81
See, e.g., Gerald E. Frug, City Services, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 32 (1998) (“It is commonly said, for
example, that human beings see themselves not simply as consumers but also as citizens--and that they think
differently in these two different roles.”) (citations omitted).
82
See, e.g., Jolls, supra note 48.
83
See Jeremy Kessler & David E. Pozen, Working Themselves Impure: A Life Cycle Theory of Legal
Theories, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1819 (2016) (arguing that prescriptive legal theories tend to become increasingly
complicated and compromised as they mature, ultimately dying out or persisting in a much-adulterated state).
84
See Eastman, supra note 65; Carol Rose, Game Stories, 22 YALE J. LAW & HUMAN. 369 (2010).
85
See, e.g., R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 15 (1988) (“It would not seem worthwhile
to spend much time investigating the properties of such a world.”).
80
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ignore the warning. The second response might be to set aside the theory as
useless. That may well be the right move in many cases, but a combination
of this response with the one above can stifle dialogue: those attracted to the
theory apply it sans warning, while everyone else ignores the theory itself.
Inversion offers a third way, one that neither rejects the theory outright nor
accepts it at face value. Instead, the logic of the theory is harnessed by
focusing analytic attention on the implications of the false assumptions.86
B. Inversion Concerns
Despite the advantages noted above, inversion invites some objections
and comes with some limitations. We can start by observing that inversion
is not an especially popular mode of scholarly engagement. It is easy to
understand why. Inversion requires approaching an established theory with
an awkward combination of embrace and pushback. The method grants
enough of the initial theory to alienate critics, yet the inversion is unlikely
to garner much appreciation from the popularized theory’s supporters.
Indeed, the original theorist is likely to assert that the inversion exercise
is redundant or turns their theory into a straw man, if the original theory
already made explicit the assumptions on which it depended. The whole
point of assumptions is that they assume something that may not be strictly
true. Models simplify reality to make a point,87 and it may seem pointless
and uncharitable to harp on the fact that a theory depends on the
assumptions that it already says it assumes, or to assert (as if it were news)
that the theory doesn’t work if the assumptions are not true. Popularizers,
for their part, have long ago stopped thinking about the unreality of the
assumptions on which the theory’s normative takeaways hinge and are
unlikely to relish reminders on this score.
One thing that can go wrong, then, is that the effort at inversion doesn’t
work to change scholarly views. One aspiration of this essay is to show that
inversion can be a valid and useful mode of discourse. Inversion has both a
critical and a constructive function. The critical function is to carefully
separate out the formal results of a theory from the normative prescriptions
associated with it. Quite simply, one cannot prescribe anything based on
assumptions that are false in policy-relevant ways.88 The constructive
86
Although we focus here on specific theories rather than broader methodological approaches, we note a
parallel between inversion and the rise of behavioral law and economics in response to the traditional rational
actor model. Significantly, behavioral law and economics accepts the premise that regularities in human behavior
can form the basis for predictions and hence for policy, but holds different assumptions from the rational actor
model about the content of those regularities. See Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economic Analysis of Redistributive
Legal Rules, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1653, 1654 (1998).
87
See RODRIK, supra note 1, at 44 (“Economic models are relevant and teach us about the world because
they are simple.”).
88
Again, we would distinguish simplifications that remain valid for predictions and policy, and those that
are indispensable to the prescriptions. See id. at 27-29 (distinguishing critical assumptions from those that are not
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function of inversion is to recognize the contribution that the formal result
makes and to show what its normative implications might be given the
falsity of the assumptions. In this way, a compelling theory can be
transformed from one that is irrelevant to policy to one that can be used as a
basis for policy.
Consider what might be the most successfully inverted theory to date,
the Coase Theorem. Of course, one can argue that it never really needed
inversion in the first place, since Coase himself subscribed to a view that
emphasized the existence of positive transaction costs. Nonetheless, a
popular view of “Coaseanism” that equated it with the capacity of
bargaining to solve all ills had to be upended in order for transaction costs
to take center stage. And this move founded an influential vein of scholarly
innovation.
Yet, as one of us has argued in other work, the Coasean inversion did
not get things quite right either.89 Transaction costs were turned into objects
of scorn, things to be attacked and minimized.90 In fact, they represent just
one way in which access to resources might be blocked once we move away
from a zero-transactions-cost world. Resource access can be blocked not
only by thwarted transactions but also by property structures that fail to
keep resources in place when their current possessor is the high valuer.
And, very significantly, another way that access to resources might go awry
would be by pouring too many of our resources into reducing transaction
costs.91
This example contains an important lesson about inversion. One cannot
simply take the false assumption—“if transaction costs were zero”—and
build policy around trying to make it as true as possible, no matter the cost
of doing so. The other examples above can be approached similarly.
Absolute justice in acquisition and transfer, perfect mobility, invariant
political action costs, and Pareto-efficient solutions to intractable collective
action problems are just as unattainable as zero transaction costs. While
pursuing each holds value, efforts to move closer to these ideals should be
pursued only insofar as the costs of doing so are worth incurring. Once that
is no longer the case, the remaining gap between reality and theory must be
accounted for in other ways.
A final concern about inversion is whether scholars might press it into
service to serve an agenda of some kind. Readers may note that three of our
examples92 involve theories that, in popular form, are associated with
essential to the conclusions); 213 (“Unrealistic assumptions are OK; unrealistic critical assumptions are not
OK.”).
89
Lee Anne Fennell, The Problem of Resource Access, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1471 (2013).
90
See, e.g., Carl J. Dahlman, The Problem of Externality, 22 J.L. & ECON. 141, 142 (1979) (“[I]n the theory
of externalities, transaction costs are the root of all evil.”).
91
See Fennell, supra note 89, at 1501-02.
92
See supra Parts II A., B., and C.
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politically conservative messages, and that in inverted form support more
politically liberal messages. But the inversion template could be applied to
all sorts of theories, including ones that are associated with politically
liberal takeaways, as the example of the Prisoners’ Dilemma shows.93 We
hope that this essay will prompt others to find their own favorite candidates
for inversion. Nonetheless, there are interesting questions about what kinds
of uninverted theories tend to take hold, notwithstanding their false
assumptions—a question we take up next.
C. What’s the Attraction?
Our examples show considerable success of theories in what we call
their uninverted form. One might ask why. Why do theories become
popular in this implausible form instead of the more plausible inversion?
It is not hard to understand why both the consumers and producers of
theories would be attracted to strong, counterintuitive normative takeaways.
In academic theorizing, fortune favors the bold. People are more likely to
notice a theory and to find ways of using it, when it appears to demonstrate
decisively some startling result. In all the cases we discuss, the uninverted
theories are bolder than the inverted ones precisely because they minimize
the apparent significance of questionable assumptions. This makes them fun
to discuss and easy to propagate.
What is perhaps more perplexing is how false assumptions gain the
staying power necessary to keep theories uninverted even when they make
no sense that way. Here, it may be helpful to consider theories that are
effectively “inverted on arrival” so that the falsity of the assumption always
takes center stage. Consider this much-quoted line from Federalist 51: “If
angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on
government would be necessary.”94 The predicate—governance by angels—
is obviously false, but perhaps no more obviously false than zero
transaction costs, perfect mobility, or complete justice in acquisition or
transfer. Yet to our knowledge no one has ever used an uninverted version
of Federalist 51 to argue that there is no need to restrain government. Why
are other theories grounded on false assumptions allowed to take hold in
uninverted form?
One possibility is that certain kinds of assumptions, like those paired
93
Cf. ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, THE RHETORIC OF REACTION: PERVERSITY, FUTILITY, JEOPARDY 149-63
(1991) (making a similar observation about the theories that he uses to illustrate rhetorical patterns emphasizing
“futility, perversity, and jeopardy” and introducing some ways that liberal theories employ similar patterns);
Eastman, supra note 65, at 732 (presenting alternative narrative versions of familiar models, including the Coase
Theorem and the PD, “that have different moral and political implications from the canonical accounts but that
accord with and illustrate the models' logical twists equally well”).
94
The Federalist, 51 (James Madison), in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 256, 257 (Lawrence Goldman, ed.,
2008).
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with mathematical models, require some degree of engagement and
deciphering before debunking is possible, something that many critics may
not be in a good position to do. It’s also possible that attacking assumptions
is simply a more common strategy in some lines of discourse than others.
For example, our anecdotal sense is that it is common to respond to a
stereotypically liberal argument by first granting the goal (e.g., helping the
poor) and then suggesting that the proposed approach (e.g., rent control)
will actually work at cross-purposes with that goal because a crucial
assumption is false (e.g., that supply will remain unchanged). More
stereotypically conservative positions, such as those rejecting redistribution
to lower-income people, may elicit a different standard response that
involves outright rejection of the theory, rather than separating out the
assumptions for detailed scrutiny. But more data points are necessary to
determine if there is any ideological skew in the picture.
Second, we believe there is a certain resilience to theories that exist in
inverted form for the true expert and mostly in uninverted form for the
academic non-expert. Because the theorist concedes somewhere that the
assumptions limit the exciting implications, the expert can assure the nonexpert that the theory is valid, even while the popular non-expert audience
embraces and deploys the theory in uninverted form. At least in our
experience, the casual reader often takes confidence in the fact that some
experts they trust endorse the theory without absorbing that the
endorsement is as carefully framed by the same unrealistic assumptions as
the original theory. This effect may give the uninverted theory remarkable
resilience.
Third, and potentially most importantly (albeit most speculatively), we
detect a theme common to all four uninverted theories we review, a possible
common reason for their popularity. The theories promise sturdy
scaffolding upon which normative analysis can be constructed, bypassing
intractable distributive disagreements at the foundation level. Most legal
academics are interested in questions about what the law should be, 95 yet
normative analysis is difficult to get off the ground when the ground itself
embeds deep distributive controversies.96
Nozick’s theory offers to show that the existing distributional pattern in
a society need not matter to justice (if each step leading to each current
property holding was just). Tiebout shows that local autonomy produces
useful competition that satisfies consumer demand (if people are mobile
95
We would contend that many legal academics who are not interested in normative questions (but who
pursue purely positive theories, as do many social sciences) have arrived at their position from despair at the
possibility of making normative progress.
96
Cf. Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or Blackstone’s Anxiety, 108 YALE L.J. 601, 605 (1998)
(“The hidden skeleton in property's closet is what I shall call the Ownership Anxiety--that is, anxiety over the
foundations for existing distribution.”).
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enough, and there are no spillovers among jurisdictions). Kaplow and
Shavell show that legal academics should ignore the intractable
distributional issues whenever they are discussing legal topics other than tax
(if the resulting distribution will be the same regardless of the method of
redistribution). The Prisoners’ Dilemma reveals a situation in which all
affected parties benefit from government intervention to coerce cooperation
(if the situation is exactly a one-shot PD with no distributional issues in how
to cooperate). In each case, the theory offers a novel and counterintuitive
means of breaking a potentially paralyzing normative impasse.
What about the Coase Theorem, which has enjoyed parallel lives in
popular and inverted form? Perhaps its successful inversion can be
explained by the fact that Coase himself worked very hard to debunk the
popularized version of the theory and press forward his original point.97
Perhaps the legal academy was also more open to receiving the inverted
message because, unlike the other examples we have provided, inversion
did not reopen any sealed-off distributive questions. Neither the popular nor
the inverted version of the Coase Theorem has anything to say about
distribution—both look only at efficiency.98 If our supposition is correct,
inversion will be most difficult to achieve—but perhaps most important to
achieve—where it requires giving up the extraordinarily useful illusion of a
distribution-free foundation for legal analysis.
CONCLUSION
Much like the numbered jokes (apocryphally) traded among traveling
salesmen,99 certain theories represent stock moves in scholarly
conversations. They serve as placeholders for conclusions that are rarely
given close scrutiny, despite their dependence on false assumptions.
Inversion shifts the focus to the theory’s false assumption to see what use
97
See, e.g., COASE, supra note 85, at 13 (explaining that his objective in discussing “what would happen in a
world in which transaction costs were assumed to be zero” was “to provide a simple setting in which to develop
the analysis and, what was even more important, to make clear the fundamental role which transaction costs do,
and should, play in the fashioning of the institutions that make up the economic system”); id. at 174 (“The world
of zero transaction costs has often been described as a Coasian world. Nothing could be further from the truth.”);
see generally Ellickson, supra note 5 (discussing Coase’s efforts to repudiate the mainstream understanding of his
ideas).
98
Significantly, the inverted theory provided a much more fertile foundation for normative legal analysis
than the popular version, which proclaimed the law’s irrelevance to efficiency. However, Coase has suggested
that his focus on positive transaction costs did open up questions that took economists out of their comfort zone.
See COASE, supra note 85, at (“The world of zero transaction costs, to which the Coase Theorem applies, is the
world of modern economic analysis, and economists therefore feel quite comfortable handling the intellectual
problems it poses, remote from the real world though they may be.”). He went on to explain that this discussion
should be regarded as “but a preliminary to the development of an analytical system capable of tackling the
problems posed by the real world of positive transaction costs.” Id. Law and economics has attempted to supply
that system, but has not yet built out the additional analytic constructs necessary to accommodate distributive
questions. See text accompanying notes 61-62, supra.
99
See G.J. Stigler, The Conference Handbook, 85 J. POLIT. ECON. 441 (1977) (recounting an “ancient joke”
along these lines and providing a humorous catalog of stock comments made at conferences).
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can yet be made of the theory. The method does not mandate any particular
way of dealing with the assumption’s falsity—except in its insistence that
we continue to see what we can learn from the underlying theory.
Unqualified theories, perhaps especially those supporting status quo
market and power structures, are more likely to be rejected root and branch
by opponents rather than inverted in the way we suggest here. This is a
mistake, at least when there remains something to learn from the theory.
Engaging with the implications of the theories under more realistic
assumptions offers a way of starting a dialogue rather than ending one.

